Isoroku Yamamoto, who later successfully attacked Pearl Harbor, argued that Japan should remain in the contract. His opinion was more complex, however, because he believed that the United States could overtake Japan by a factor greater than the ratio of 5 to 3, as it had a huge production advantage in the United States, which he had agreed to since he had served at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. After signing the treaty, he said, “Anyone who has seen the Detroit auto plants and the oil fields in Texas knows that Japan does not have the power to have a maritime race with America.” He later added: “The report works very well for Japan – it`s a contract to limit the other parties.”  He believed that methods other than the explosion of construction would be necessary to seize even the opportunities that may have contributed to his commitment to the Pearl Harbor plan of attack. In January 1933 Hitler became German chancellor. The new German government had inherited in Geneva a strong negotiating position from the previous government of General Kurt von Schleicher. The German strategy was to make idealistic offers for limited rearmament, sketching that all these offers would be rejected by the French, so that Germany could finally continue with maximum rearmament. The ultranationalism of the Nazi regime had alerted the French, who put in the armour the most minimal interpretation possible of the German “theoretical equality”, thus alluding to the German strategy. In October 1933, the Germans left the conference again and declared that all the others should either disarm at Versailles or allow Germany to equip itself beyond Versailles.  Although the Germans never had a serious interest in accepting any of the United Kingdom`s various compromise proposals in London, the German exit was largely attributed, albeit incorrectly, to French “intransigence”.
The British government has been left to the conviction that in the future, the possibilities of arms control talks with the Germans should not be lost because of French “intransigence”. The UK`s subsequent proposals to organize Germany`s return to the World Conference on Disarmament were sabotaged by the Germans who made proposals to challenge the United Kingdom, even though they were unacceptable to the French. On 17 April 1934, the last such effort ended with the rejection of the recent German offer by the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, whom the so-called “Barthou” note called unacceptable, ending French participation in the conference, while declaring that France would take care of its own security properly. At the same time, Admiral Erich Raeder of the Reichsmarine convinced Hitler of the advantages of commanding two more armoured ships and, in 1933, advised the Chancellor that Germany be doing best until 1948 with a fleet of three aircraft carriers, 18 cruisers, eight armoured ships, 48 destroyers and 74 submarines.  Admiral Raeder argued to Hitler that Germany needed naval parity with France, while from April 1933 Hitler expressed the wish for an imperial navy of 33.3% of the Royal Navy`s total tonnage.  The Washington Navy Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Contract, was a treaty signed in 1922 among the great nations that had won World War I. It was negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference from November 1921 to February 1922 in Washington, D.C. and signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy and Japan.
It limited the construction of battleships, battlecruund cruisers and aircraft carriers by the signatories. The treaty did not limit the number of other categories of warships, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, but these vessels were limited to 10,000 tonnes of eviction. Part V of the 1919 Treaty of Versaille severely limited the size and capabilities of the German armed forces.